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Abstract
This paper describes the impact on transportation network companies (TNCs) of the imposition of a
congestion charge and a driver minimum wage. The impact is assessed using a market equilibrium model
to calculate the changes in the number of passenger trips and trip fare, number of drivers employed, the
TNC platform profit, the number of TNC vehicles, and city revenue. Two charges are considered: (a) a
charge per TNC trip similar to an excise tax, and (b) a charge per vehicle operating hour (whether or
not it has a passenger) similar to a road tax. Both charges reduce the number of TNC trips, but this
reduction is limited by the wage floor, and the number of TNC vehicles reduced is not significant. The
time-based charge is preferable to the trip-based charge since, by penalizing idle vehicle time, the former
increases vehicle occupancy. In a case study for San Francisco, the time-based charge is found to be Pareto
superior to the trip-based charge as it yields higher passenger surplus, higher platform profits, and higher
tax revenue for the city.
Keywords: TNC, ride-sourcing, congestion charge, wage floor, regulatory policy.
1. Introduction
Transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber, Lyft and Didi, have dramatically changed urban
transportation. They provide on-demand ride services that are more attractive than public transit and
other transport modes and are offered at prices that many can afford. At the same time the TNCs create
numerous job opportunities for drivers working as independent contractors. These favorable demand and
supply factors led to the TNC’s explosive growth.
However, the resulting growth has raised two public concerns in large metropolitan areas. The first is
due to increased traffic congestion. In New York City, Uber, Lyft, Juno and Via together dispatch nearly
600,000 rides per day, involving about 80,000 vehicles. Schaller [1] estimates that from 2013 to 2017 TNC
trips in NYC increased by 15%, traffic speed dropped by 15%, VMT increased by 36%, and the number
of TNC vehicles increased by 59%. He suggested regulation to reduce TNC vehicles deadhead time (when
vehicles are carrying no passengers) in order to limit congestion. Two reports [2, 3] by the San Francisco
County Transportation Authority identified TNC impact on traffic congestion and estimated that TNCs
account for approximately 50 percent of the increase in congestion in San Francisco between 2010 and 2016.
More recently, Uber and Lyft commissioned Fehr & Peer to estimate the TNC share of VMT in six US
Metropolitan Regions, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle, San Francisco and Washington. Their report
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[4] concludes that Uber and Lyft have a nontrivial impact in core urban areas such as San Francisco County,
where they account for 12.8% of total VMT.
The second concern is provoked by the very low earnings of TNC drivers. The success of the on-demand
ride-hailing business relies on short passenger waiting times that require a large pool of available but idle
TNC drivers. This pushes down driver wages. Parrott and Reich [5] revealed that the majority of for-hire
vehicle drivers in NYC work full-time. They found that the median driver earnings declined almost $3 per
hour from $25.67 in September 2016 to $22.90 in October 2017, and that 85 percent of drivers made less
than the minimum wage after deducting vehicle expenses. A follow-up study [6] examined the payments
of drivers working for TNCs in Seattle and discovered that their average net earning is $9.73/hour (after
expenses), well below the $16.39/hour minimum wage. Further, more than four-fifths of full time drivers
purchased their vehicle primarily or partly to provide TNC services, and nearly three-fourths rely on TNC
driving as their sole source of income. These drivers are hired as independent contractors, who can not
unionize to negotiate for labor rights such as minimum wage, overtime compensation, and paid time-off.
These concerns have prompted cities to regulate TNCs. To address congestion, New York City Taxi and
Limousine Commission (NYCTLC) introduced a $2.75 charge on all for-hire vehicle trips that pass through
the “congestion zone” of the city [7]. The congestion zone is the area south of 96th Street in Manhattan,
and the charge is assessed on each trip that starts from, ends in, or passes through the congestion area. To
protect TNC drivers, NYCTLC imposed a minimum per-trip wage for drivers amounting to a wage floor of
$25.76/hour or $17.22/hour after vehicle expenses [8]. This is equivalent to the 15$/hour minimum wage
after deducting a paid-time off supplement of 2.22$/hour. Aside from NYC, similar regulations are being
considered by other U.S. cities. In November 2019 Chicago approved a congestion tax on ride-hailing services
for weekday single-passenger trips (and lowered the tax on shared trips) in the downtown area to raise $40
million per year [9]. Also in November 2019 San Francisco passed a special 3.25% excise tax on TNC rides
to raise $30-$35 million per year for congestion mitigation projects [10]. At around the same time, the
Seattle City Council unanimously approved the “Fare Share” plan, which provides TNC driver protections
including a fair wage after expenses and a first-in-the-nation Driver Resolution Center to offer support
services for drivers to fight against unwarranted deactivations [11]. In September 2019 California passed
bill AB5 [12] which classifies hundreds of thousands of independent contractors (gig workers) including
TNC drivers as employees to protect them with minimum wage and other employee benefits. These actions
imply a changing regulatory environment to address TNC-provoked concerns in large cities.
This paper presents a study calculating the impact on TNCs of the joint imposition of a congestion charge
and a driver minimum wage. The impact is formulated within a framework comprised of a queuing theoretic
model of the arrivals of passengers and drivers, a general equilibrium model that predicts market prices,
passenger demand and driver supply, and a profit maximizing model of the TNC platform decisions. This
framework enables the assessment of the impact in terms of changes in ride prices, passenger waiting time,
driver wage, numbers of passengers and drivers, vehicle occupancy rate, platform rent, and city tax revenue.
The key conclusions of this study are:
• The congestion charge does not significantly affect TNC ridership. It does not directly curb traffic
congestion by reducing the number of TNC vehicles on the road. This is because the impact of the
surcharge is mitigated by the wage floor on TNC drivers.
• The time-based congestion charge is preferable to the trip-based charge because the former penalizes
idle vehicle hours, thereby increasing vehicle occupancy (we use the terms congestion charge and
tax interchangeably.) Furthermore, the increased occupancy generates a surplus that offers a Pareto
improvement in a certain regime, bringing higher consumer surplus, higher platform profit and higher
tax revenue for the city.
• The case study for San Francisco employs a model whose parameters are calibrated to match reported
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San Francisco TNC data, and the model is used to predict the likely effect of regulatory policies on
the San Francisco TNC market.
• Through numerical simulation, we show that the tax burden mainly falls on the ride-hailing platform
as opposed to passengers and drivers. Under a trip-based tax of $2/trip (with average trip fare of
$11.6), passenger travel cost increases by 0.6%, driver wage remains unchanged, while the platform
profit is reduced by 59.5%. Under a time-based tax in the regime of practical interest, both passengers
and drivers are unaffected, while the platform assumes all of the tax burden.
2. Related Works
There is an extensive literature on app-based ride-hailing platforms. Many studies investigated the platform
pricing strategy under various interacting factors. Zha et al [13] developed an aggregate model to capture
the interactions among passengers, drivers and the platform, and found that the first-best solution is
not sustainable when the matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale and the cost function of
the platform is subject to economies of scale. Bai et al [14] considered an on-demand service platform
using earning-sensitive independent providers with heterogeneous reservation price, and concluded that it
is optimal to charge a higher price when demand increases, and that the platform should offer a higher
payout ratio as demand increases, capacity decreases, or customers become more sensitive to waiting time.
Taylor [15] examined how delay sensitivity and agent independence affect the platform’s optimal price and
wage and identified the complexity caused by uncertainty in customer valuation. Hu and Zhou [16] studied
the commission setting of the ride-sourcing platform and showed that an optimal fixed-commission contract
can achieve at least 75% of the optimal profit when there is no pre-committed relationship between price
and wage.
Platform pricing has also been studied with temporal and spatial considerations. From the temporal aspect,
Cachon et al [17] showed that surge pricing can significantly increase platform profit relative to contracts
that have a fixed price or fixed wage, and that all stakeholders can benefit from the use of surge pricing on
a platform with driver self-scheduling capacity. Castillo et al [18] showed that surge pricing can avoid cases
where vehicles are sent on a wild goose chase to pick up distant customers, wasting driver time and reducing
earnings. Zha et al [19] investigated the impact of surge pricing using a bi-level programming framework, and
showed that compared to static pricing, the platform and drivers are found generally to enjoy higher revenue
while customers may be made worse off during highly surged periods. Banerjee et al [20] developed a queuing
theoretic model to study the optimal (i.e. profit-maximizing) pricing of ride-sharing platforms. They show
that the performance of a dynamic price (in terms of revenue and throughput) does not exceed that of a
static price, but it is more robust to fluctuations of model parameters. From the spatial aspect, Bimpikis
et al [21] considered the price discrimination of a ride-sourcing platform over a transportation network and
established that profits and consumer surplus at the equilibrium corresponding to the platform’s optimal
pricing are maximized when the demand pattern is “balanced” across the network’s locations. Guda and
Subramanian [22] studied the spatial pricing of a ride-sourcing platform over a transportation network and
showed that surge pricing can be useful even in zones where supply exceeds demand. Zha et al [23] developed
a model to investigate the effects of spatial pricing on ride-sourcing markets and found that the platform
may resort to relatively higher price to avoid an inefficient supply state if spatial price differentiation is
not allowed. In addition to platform pricing, studies also touch upon driver supply [24], [25], platform
operations [26], [27], platform competition [28], [29], and regulations [30], [31], [32], [33]. Please see [34] for
a comprehensive literature review.
Road pricing has attracted substantial research attention for decades. The idea was initially proposed by
Pigou [35], which inspired several seminal works including Vickery [36], Walters [37] and Beckmann [38].
Since then, various taxing schemes have been proposed in the literature, including charge based on cordon-
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crossing, distance traveled, time spent traveling, or time spent in congestion [39]. For instance, Zhang
and Yang [40] investigate the cordon-based second-best congestion pricing problem on road networks that
jointly consider toll levels and toll locations. Yang et al [41] study road pricing for effective congestion
control without knowing the link travel time and travel demand. Liu and Li [42] derive a time-varying toll
combined with a flat ride-sharing price to nudge morning travelers to depart in off-peak hours. Despite
this large literature in transportation economics, the research on congestion charges for TNCs is relatively
scarce. A TNC congestion charge is distinctive since it involves decisions of the profit-maximizing platform
and the passengers and drivers in the two-sided ride-hailing market. Li et al [30] proposed a market
equilibrium model to evaluate the impact of various regulatory policies and analyzed the incidence of a
TNC tax on passengers, drivers, and the TNC platform. Schaller [43] conducted an in-depth analysis of
how to apply pricing to new mobility services, and recommended that a surcharge on taxi/for-hire trips
in central Manhattan be applied as an hourly charge. Recent work of Vignon and Yin [33] investigated
the performance of various regulation policies on ride-sourcing platforms with congestion externality and
product differentiation taken into account. They compared a uniform toll that treats all vehicles identically
with a differentiated toll that treats idle vehicles, solo rides and pooled rides differently, and showed that
a differentiated toll offers little advantage over a uniform one.
Only a handful of studies considered wage regulation of TNCs. Gurvich [44] studied the platform’s profit
maximizing wage level for self-scheduling drivers, and showed that under a minimum wage, the platform
limits agent flexibility by restricting the number of agents that can work during some time intervals. Parrott
and Reich [5] utilized administrative data of New York City and showed by simulation that the proposed
minimum wage standard in New York City will increase driver wage by 22.5 percent while hurting passengers
by slightly increasing ride fare and waiting time. Li et al. [30] and Benjaafar et al. [31] developed market
equilibrium models to show that wage regulations on TNC will benefit both passengers and drivers, because
wage regulation curbs TNC labor market power [30]. Zhang and Nie [45] proposed a market equilibrium
model for ride-sourcing platforms that offers a mix of solo and pooled rides. They showed that a wage
floor on TNC drivers will force the platform to hire more drivers, which will reduce the appeal of collective
modes and the supply efficiency and is likely to worsen traffic congestion.
This paper differs from the aforementioned works in that we explore the joint impact of congestion charge
and driver minimum wage on the TNC market. We are the first to point out that distinct regulatory
policies on TNCs do interfere with each other when they are jointly implemented, which may produce
surprising market outcomes that deviate from the expectation of the policy maker. We are also the first to
establish models that compare the trip-based congestion charge and the time-based congestion charge and
identify the superiority of time-based congestion in certain regimes of practical interest. These results will
provide valuable insights for city planners who are considering implementing (e.g., San Francisco), or have
already implemented (e.g., NYC and Seattle) a congestion charge and a minimum wage to address TNC
externalities.
3. Market Equilibrium Model
We consider a transportation system comprised of a city council, a TNC platform, and a group of passengers
and drivers. The city council approves legislation (e.g., cap on the total number of vehicles, minimum wage
for TNC drivers, congestion charge on TNC trips) to regulate the operations of the TNC platform. The
platform sets fares and wages and hires drivers to maximize its profit under these regulations. The pricing
decisions affect the choices of passengers and drivers, and these choices collectively determine the platform’s
profit. We will describe a market equilibrium model to capture the decisions of passengers, drivers, and the
TNC platform. The model will be used to investigate how TNC market outcomes are affected by regulation.
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3.1. Matching passengers and drivers
The TNC platform matches randomly arriving passengers to idle TNC drivers. Upon arrival, each passenger
joins a queue and waits until she or he is matched to an idle driver1. This matching is modeled as a
continuous-time queuing process, in which each passenger defines a “job” and each driver is a “server”. The
server is “idle” if the vehicle is not occupied, and it is “busy” if a passenger is on board or if the vehicle is
dispatched and on its way to pick up a passenger. Assume that passenger arrivals form a Poisson process
with rate λ > 0, and denote N as the total number of TNC drivers. This matching process forms a M/G/N
queue, and the expected number of idle servers (vehicles) is NI = N − λ/µ, with µ being the service rate
(1/µ is the amount of time a passenger occupies a vehicle on average). We assume that N > λ/µ.
3.2. Passenger incentives
The total travel cost of the TNC passenger consists of the waiting time for pickup, the travel time during
the trip, and the monetary payment for the ride service. We refer to this total travel cost as the “generalized
cost” and define it as the weighted sum of waiting time, travel time, and trip fare. It may differ for distinct
passengers due to the randomness in trip length, trip duration, and the matching process of the TNC
platform. Since we primarily focus on aggregate market outcomes, we define the average generalized cost
as:
c = αtw + βt0 + pf , (1)
where tw is the average waiting time, t0 is the average trip duration (in minutes), and pf is the average price
of a TNC ride. The parameters α and β specify the passenger trade-off between time and money. Note that
α is generally larger than β since empirical study suggests that the value of time while waiting is larger than
the value of time while traveling in the vehicle. It is important to emphasize that we do not need to assume
that all passengers have the same travel cost. The heterogeneity in passengers is irrelevant as we focus on
the aggregate market outcome, which typically depends on the average cost c. A widely-studied example is
the logit choice model, where the total number of agents choosing a particular mode only depends on the
average cost of each mode. In this spirit, we define a demand function that determines the arrival rate of
TNC passengers as a function of the average generalized cost:
λ = λ0Fp(c), (2)
where λ0 is the arrival rate of potential passengers (total travel demand in the city), and Fp(·) is the
proportion of potential passengers who choose a TNC ride. We assume that Fp(·) is a strictly decreasing and
continuously differentiable function so that a higher TNC travel cost c will lead to fewer TNC passengers.
The logit model is a special case of (2).
The passenger waiting time tw intimately interacts with other endogenous decision variables λ and N .
To delineate this relation, we divide a TNC ride into three time periods: (1) from ride being requested
to the ride being confirmed, (2) from the ride being confirmed to passenger pickup, (3) from passenger
pickup to drop-off. Let tm, tp, and t0 represent the length of these three periods, respectively, then we have
tw = tm + tp, and t0 as the average trip distance L divided by traffic speed v, i.e., t0 = L/v. Since the
platform immediately matches each newly arrived passenger to the nearest idle vehicle, tm is the average
waiting time in the queue, and tp depends on the traffic speed v and the distance of the passenger to the
nearest idle vehicle, which further depends on the number of idle vehicles NI . Therefore, we write tp as a
function of NI and v, i.e., tp(NI , v). The following assumption is imposed on tp(·):
Assumption 1. tp(NI , v) is twice differentiable with respect to NI and v. It is decreasing and strictly
convex with respect to NI , and it is decreasing with respect to traffic speed v.
1For simplicity, we do not consider the case of multiple passengers sharing the same vehicle.
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Assumption 1 requires that the pickup time decreases with respect to the number of idle vehicles and the
traffic speed. We suppose traffic speed v(N) is a function of the total number N of vehicles and impose
the following assumption on v(·):
Assumption 2. v(N) is decreasing and continuously differentiable with respect to N .
The ride confirmation time tm is typically less than 30 seconds and the pickup time tp is 3-5 minutes.
Therefore we ignore tm and express the total waiting time tw as2
tw = tp(NI , v). (3)
The number of idle vehicles NI depends on λ and N , whereas the average traffic speed v depends on N .
3.3. Driver incentives
In the TNC market, drivers can decide whether to remain subscribed to the TNC platform depending on
the long-term average earnings offered by the platform. The average hourly wage of drivers depends on the
ride fare of the TNC trip, the commission rate set by the platform, and the occupancy rate of the vehicles.
It can be described as:
w =
λpd
N
, (4)
where pd is the average per-trip payment to drivers. The driver payment pd differs from the passenger
trip fare pf . The difference pf − pd is kept by the platform as profit. Therefore, the commission rate of
the platform (typically 25%-40%) can be written as (pf − pd)/pf . The average hourly wage (4) is just the
total platform payment to all drivers λpd divided by the total number of drivers N . Each driver may have
an hourly earning that differs from the earning of others due to the randomness in work schedule, driver
location, and repositioning strategy. However, as we primarily focus on the aggregated market outcome,
the heteregeneity in driver earnings is irrelevant as far as the aggregate market outcome (e.g.,total number
of TNC passengers or drivers) only depends on the average hourly earning over all TNC drivers. Note that
this is the case for the well-established logit choice model. More generally, we define a supply function that
determines the total number of TNC drivers as a function of the average hourly wage:
N = N0Fd(w), (5)
where N0 is the number of potential drivers (all drivers seeking a job), and Fd(w) is a strictly increasing
and continuously differentiable function that gives the proportion of drivers willing to join TNC. Note that
the logit model is a special case of (5)
3.4. Platform decisions in absence of regulation
The TNC platform determines the ride prices and the driver payment to gauge passengers and drivers
to maximize its profit. In each time period, the platform revenue is the total ride fares received from
passengers, i.e., λpf , and the platform cost is the total payment made to the drivers, i.e., λpd. The profit
of the platform can be thus written as the difference between the revenue and the cost
max
pf ,pd
λ(pf − pd) (6)
2The waiting time can be significantly larger in rush hours. In this case, one can add tm to tw as the waiting time in the
queue. We believe that this will not affect our conclusion, but we neglect this term in this paper for analytic tractability.
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
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf ) (7a)
N = N0Fd
(
λpd
N
)
(7b)
where (7a) is the demand function and (7b) is the supply function. Note that tp depends on λ and N , and
p0 depends on the traffic speed which is a function of N . The overall problem not only involves pf and pd
as decision variables, but also involves N , λ, tp, v and p0 as endogenous variables. The optimal solution to
(6) represents the platform’s profit-maximizing pricing decision in absence of the regulatory intervention.
Remark 1. Many works study the spatial and temporal aspects of the TNC market. These aspects are
neglected in our model since we primarily focus on the evaluation of regulatory policies (e.g., minimum
wage) that are imposed on a uniform basis regardless of the time of the day or the location of the driver.
This makes it legitimate to consider the impact of these policies at the aggregate scale, which suffices to
provide valuable insights for city planners to assess their policies. A spatial-temporal analysis is necessary
if policy makers further consider fine-tuning these policies so that they differentiate trips at different time
instances or different locations. This is left for future work.
3.5. Modeling regulation policies
Regulation policies, such as congestion charge and driver minimum wage, modify the incentives of passengers
and drivers and affect the pricing decision of the TNC platform. To capture this effect, we formulate the
platform pricing problem under the minimum wage, trip-based congestion charge, and time-based congestion
charge.
Minimum wage: To capture the impact of a driver wage floor w0, we impose the constraint that requires
the driver hourly earning to be greater than w0. The optimal pricing problem under minimum wage
regulation can be formulated as:
max
pf ,pd
λ(pf − pd) (8)
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf ) (9a)
N ≤ N0Fd
(
λpd
N
)
(9b)
λpd
N
≥ w0 (9c)
where constraint (9c) captures the wage floor on TNC driver earnings. Note that we relax the equality
constraint (7b) to inequality constraint (9b). This permits the TNC platform to hire a subset of drivers
who are willing to work for TNC in case the minimum wage is set so high that it is unprofitable for the
platform to hire all the willing drivers in the market.
Trip-based congestion charge: Many existing congestion charge schemes are trip-based (e.g., New York
City, Seattle, Chicago). The trip-based congestion charge assesses an extra fee of pt on each TNC trip in
the congestion area. When a congestion charge pt and a minimum wage w0 are imposed concurrently, the
optimal pricing problem can be formulated as follows:
max
pf ,pd
λ(pf − pd) (10)

λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf + pt) (11a)
N ≤ N0Fd
(
λpd
N
)
(11b)
λpd
N
≥ w0 (11c)
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where the per-trip congestion charge pt is incorporated into the passenger travel cost within the demand
function (11a). Another way to formulate the congestion charge is by adding it to the cost of the platform.
This is easier to implement as it only requires the platform to transfer the accumulated congestion charge
of all trips within certain period to the city. In this case, the optimal pricing problem can be written as:
max
pf ,pd
λ(pf − pd)− λpt (12)
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf ) (13a)
N ≤ N0Fd
(
λpd
N
)
(13b)
λpd
N
≥ w0 (13c)
where pt is incorporated into the profit of the platform instead of the travel cost of the passengers.
Economists find that whether a tax is levied on the buyer or seller of the good does not matter because
they always share the tax burden based on their elasticities [46, Chap. 16]. This principle also applies here:
Proposition 1. Let (p∗f , p
∗
d, N
∗, λ∗) and (p∗∗f , p
∗∗
d , N
∗∗, λ∗∗) denote the optimal solutions to (10) and (12),
respectively, then we have p∗f + pt = p
∗∗
f , p
∗
d = p
∗∗
d , λ
∗ = λ∗∗, and N∗ = N∗∗.
Proposition 1 states that the two formulations of trip-based congestion charge, i.e., (10) and (12), lead to
the same market outcome. The proof is omitted since it can be simply derived by a change of variable.
Time-based congestion charge: Distinct from the trip-based congestion charge, the time-based charge
is levied on TNC vehicles based on vehicle hours instead of trip volumes. The key difference between the
two congestion charge schemes is that time-based congestion charge not only penalizes TNC trips, but
also penalizes idle TNC hours and thus incentivizes the platform to improve vehicle utilization. When the
time-based congestion charge ph and a minimum wage w0 are concurrently levied on TNC drivers, we have
the following formulation:
max
pf ,pd
λ(pf − pd) (14)
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf + pt) (15a)
N ≤ N0Fd
(
λpd
N
− ph
)
(15b)
λpd
N
− ph ≥ w0 (15c)
When the time-based congestion charge is levied on the TNC platform, we have the following formulation:
max
pf ,pd
λ(pf − pd)−Nph (16)
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf ) (17a)
N ≤ N0Fd
(
λpd
N
)
(17b)
λpd
N
≥ w0 (17c)
Similar to the trip-based congestion charge, these two forms of formulations are equivalent.
Proposition 2. Let (p¯d, p¯d, N¯ , λ¯) and (p˜f , p˜d, N˜ , λ˜) denote the optimal solutions to (14) and (16), respec-
tively, then we have p¯f = p˜f ,
λ¯p¯d
N¯
− ph = λ˜p˜d
N˜
, λ¯ = λ˜, and N¯ = N˜ .
Proposition 2 states that the two formulations of time-based congestion charge, i.e., (14) and (16), lead to
the same market outcome. The proof is omitted since it is similar to that of Proposition 1.
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4. Profit maximization under trip-based congestion charge
This section analyzes the joint impact of a trip-based congestion charge and a minimum wage for TNC
drivers. We consider a platform that determines the ride fare pf and the per-trip driver payment pd to
maximize its profit λ(pf − pd) under the trip-based congestion charge pt and a minimum wage w0. The
optimal pricing problem can be formulated as (10) or (12). For sake of exposition, we will start with a
realistic numerical example for San Francisco. The numerical example will be complemented by a theoretical
analysis presented later that shows the insights derived from the numerical example can be generalized.
4.1. Numerical example
We investigate the impact of the proposed regulations via a case study for San Francisco (followed by
theoretical analysis in the next subsection). Assume that passengers choose their transport mode based on
the total travel cost. We use a logit model so the demand function for TNC rides is
λ = λ0
e−c
e−c + e−c0
, (18)
where c is the total travel cost of a TNC trip, and  > 0 and c0 are parameters. Similarly, drivers choose
to work for the TNC depending on its wage. Under a logit model, the supply function is
N = N0
eσw
eσw + eσw0
, (19)
where σ is a parameter. We note that (18) is a special case of the general demand function (2), and (19)
is a special case of the general supply function (5).
Passenger pickup time tp follows the “square root law” established in [47] and [30]:
tp(NI , v) =
M
v
√
N − λ/µ, (20)
where the constant M depends on the travel times in the city. The square root law establishes that the
average pickup time is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of idle vehicles in the city,
(N−λ/µ). The intuition behind (20) is straightforward. Suppose all idle vehicles are uniformly distributed
throughout the city, then the distance between any two nearby idle vehicles is inversely proportional to the
square root of the total number of idle vehicles. This distance is proportional to that between the passenger
and the closest idle vehicle, which determines the pickup time. A justification of the square root law can
be found in [30].
The average traffic speed v is a function of the total traffic. Using Greenshield model [48] gives the linear
speed-density relation3,
v = v0 − κ(N +Nb), (21)
where Nb is the background traffic4, N is the number of TNC vehicles, and v0 and κ are model parameters.
Assuming that Nb is constant, (21) is equivalent to
v = vf − κN. (22)
3Since TNC vehicles only account for a small percentage of the overall traffic, the Greenshield model can be regarded as a
linear approximation in a small neighborhood of a nonlinear speed-density function.
4TNC trips may substitute taxis or private vehicles. This may introduce coupling between the TNC demand and the
background traffic Nb. For simplicity, we neglect this substitution effect and assume Nb is exogenous. We leave it for future
work to investigate how the coupling between λ and Nb affect the conclusion of this paper.
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In summary, the model parameters are
Θ = {λ0, N0,M,L, vf , κ, α, , c0, σ, w0}.
In the numerical study we set the parameters values so that the optimal solution to (6) matches the real
data of San Francisco city. The values of these model parameters are summarized below:
λ0 = 1049/min, N0 = 10000, M = 41.18, L = 2.6 mile, vf = 15 mph, κ = 0.0003,
α = 2.33,  = 0.33, c0 = 31.2, σ = 0.089, w0 = $31.04/hour.
For the data source (from San Francisco) and justification of these parameter values, please refer to Ap-
pendix A.
We solve the profit maximizing problem (10) for different values of congestion charge pt under a fixed wage
floor w0, and plot all the variables as a function of pt. The minimum wage of TNC drivers in San Francisco
is set in a way similar to that in NYC. Under current NYC regulations, the TNC driver minimum wage is
$25.76/hour, which is equivalent to the $15/hour minimum wage of NYC after deducting vehicle expenses
such as insurance, maintenance and taxes. Since the hourly minimum wage of San Francisco is $0.59 higher
than in NYC, we set w0 = $25.76 + $0.59 = $26.35/hour to compensate for this difference.
4.2. Analysis
Figure 1- Figure 3 show the number of drivers, passenger arrival rate, and the occupancy rate of TNC
vehicles as a function of the congestion charge pt when the minimum wage is set at w0 = $26.35/hour.
Figure 4 shows the per-trip ride fare pf and the driver payment pd. Figure 5-Figure 6 show the passenger
pickup time and travel cost. Figure 7 shows the driver wage (which equals the minimum wage). Figure 8
and Figure 9 show the platform profit and city’s tax revenue under different values of pt, respectively.
Clearly, the optimal solution as a function of pt has two distinct regimes:
• when pt ≤ $2.1/trip, the number of drivers remains constant, while the number of passengers reduces;
vehicle occupancy drops, passenger pickup time decreases, ride fare increases, and the passenger total
travel cost increases. At the same time, driver wage remains constant and equals the minimum wage,
platform profit reduces, and the tax revenue increases.
• when pt > $2.1/trip, both the passenger arrival rate and number of TNC drivers reduce sharply;
vehicle occupancy reduces, ride fare and pickup time increase, and the total travel cost increases. The
driver wage remains constant and equals the minimum wage, while the platform revenue declines, and
the tax revenue increases.
This is a surprising result: the number of drivers is unaffected by the congestion charge pt when pt ≤
$2.1/trip. It is in contrast with the case when there is only a congestion charge and no minimum wage
(see [30]). Therefore, this set of result indicates that the effect of a congestion charge on congestion relief
is mitigated by the wage floor on TNC drivers. In certain regimes, the congestion charge cannot directly
curb traffic congestion by reducing the number of TNC vehicles.
The reason behind this surprising result is rooted in the platform’s power in the labor market. The platform
is a monopoly in the labor market and sets driver wages. When there is no regulation (i.e., pt = 0 and
w0 = 0), the platform hires fewer drivers to maximize its profit compared to a competitive labor market
where the TNC faces the competitive driver wage. In a certain regime, the minimum wage squeezes the
platform’s market power and induces it to hire more drivers [30]. This indicates that the marginal profit
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Figure 9: Per-hour tax revenue under
different trip-based congestion charge.
of hiring additional drivers under the minimum wage regulation is positive. When the congestion charge is
insignificant, this marginal profit reduces but remains positive, and thus the platform still hires all drivers
available in the labor market. The number of drivers is upper bounded by N ≤ N0Fd(w0). Therefore, in the
first regime, N remains constant and satisfies N = N0Fd(w0). If the congestion charge is further increased,
the marginal profit of hiring an additional driver reduces to zero, and the system enters the second regime.
Figures 6-8 show that the tax burden primarily falls on the ride-hailing platform as opposed to passengers
and drivers. As the trip-based charge increases, the passenger cost increases slightly, the driver wage
remains unchanged, while platform profit reduces significantly. In particular, under a trip-based tax of
$2/trip, passenger cost increases by 0.6%, driver wage remains constant, and platform profit declines by
59.5%. This is because drivers are protected by the minimum wage, and the passenger’s price elasticity5 is
relatively high (Figure 10) so that the platform has to refrain from significantly increasing the ride fare.
5The passenger price elasticity is
∂λ
∂pf
pf
λ
. We calculate
∂λ
∂pf
assuming that the waiting time tw is fixed under different pt.
This is a reasonable approximation since tw does not change significantly under distinct pt (Figure 5).
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.
We show that the result reported in Figure 1-Figure 9 (including number of drivers, number of passen-
gers, platform revenue, and tax revenue) is robust for a large range of model parameters. For notation
convenience, let w˜ be the optimal driver wage set by the platform in the absence of any regulation (i.e.,
pt = w0 = 0), and denote by N∗t (pt) the optimal number of drivers to (10) under a fixed wage floor, which
depends on pt. We then have the following result.
Theorem 1. Assume that (10) has a unique solution. For any model parameters λ0, N0 and α, any strictly
decreasing function Fp(c), any strictly increasing function Fd(w), any pickup time function tp that satisfies
Assumption 1, and any speed-density relation v(N) that satisfies Assumption 2, there exists w1 > w˜, such
that for any w˜ < w0 < w1, there exists p¯t > 0, so that ∂N∗t /∂pt = 0 for pt ∈ (0, p¯t).
The proof of Theorem 1 is can be found in Appendix B. It states that for any wage floor in an appropriate
range, there is always a regime in which the congestion charge does not affect the number of TNC vehicles or
drivers. In this case, the congestion charge will not directly curb the congestion by reducing the number of
TNC vehicle on the city’s streets. Instead, it can only indirectly mitigate the traffic congestion by collecting
taxes to subsidize public transit to attract passengers. Note that w˜ and w1 can be calculated numerically,
and p¯t depends on the wage floor w0. For the case of San Francisco, we calculate that w˜ = $21.55/hour,
w1 = $29.20/hour, and p¯t = $2.1/trip when w0 = $26.35/hour.
5. Profit maximization under time-based congestion surcharge
This section considers the profit maximization problem under a wage floor and a time-based congestion
charge. Under the time-based charge, each vehicle is penalized based on the total time it stays active
on the platform (whether there is a passenger on board or not). Let ph denote the per-vehicle per-unit-
time congestion charge. The total charge (per unit time) is Nph, and the profit maximization problem
is cast as (14). For sake of exposition, we will first present a numerical example for San Francisco. The
insights derived from the numerical study will be examined by theoretical analysis later to demonstrate its
independence on model parameters.
In the numerical study, we will solve the profit maximization problem (14) for different time-based conges-
tion charge ph under a fixed wage floor w0 = $26.35/hour. The model parameters of (14) are the same as
those in Section 4.1.
Figure 11 - Figure 13 display the number of drivers, passenger arrival rates, and vehicle occupancy as a
function of the time-based congestion charge. Figure 14 shows the ride fare and per-trip driver payment.
Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the passenger pickup time and total travel cost. Figure 17 shows the driver
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0 2 4 6 8 10
0
1
2
3
·104
time-based tax
ta
x
re
ve
nu
e
Figure 19: Per-hour tax revenue under
different time-based congestion charge.
wage. Figure 18 and Figure 19 present the platform profit and tax revenue, respectively. Clearly, the plots
in Figure 11-19 have two distinct regimes:
• when ph ≤ $6.2/hour the number of TNC drivers and the passenger arrival rate remain constant.
So do the occupancy rate, ride fare, per-trip driver payment, pickup time, passenger travel cost and
driver wage. The platform revenue reduces linearly, and the tax revenue also increases linearly.
• when ph > $6.2/hour the numbers of drivers and passengers decline. Vehicle occupancy, ride fare (pf )
and per-trip driver payment (pd) also decline. The pickup time and passenger travel cost increase.
The driver wage is constant and equals the minimum wage. The platform profit reduces and the tax
revenue increases.
Simulation results suggest that the time-based congestion charge does not affect the number of TNC vehicles
unless the charge is greater than $6.2/hour. In that case the effect of the congestion charge on congestion
relief is mitigated by the minimum wage on TNC drivers. This observation is consistent with the results
in Section 4.2 and for the same reason. However, in contrast with the trip-based charge, the time-based
charge does not affect passenger arrivals (Figure 12). This indicates that the time-based charge leads to a
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Figure 20: Number of drivers under dif-
ferent schemes of congestion surcharge.
Figure 21: Comparison of passenger ar-
rival rate (per minute).
Figure 22: Occupancy rate under differ-
ent congestion surcharges.
Figure 23: Per-trip ride price under dif-
ferent congestion surcharges.
Figure 24: Comparison of passenger
pickup time (minute).
Figure 25: Platform revenue under dif-
ferent congestion surcharges.
direct money transfer from the platform to the city in the first regime without affecting the passengers or
drivers. This is evidenced by the linear curves in the first regime of Figure 18-19.
The quantitative results in Figure 11-Figure 19 are robust with respect to the variation of model parameters.
Formally, denote by N∗h(ph) and λ
∗
h(ph) the optimal number of drivers and passenger arrival rates to (14)
under a fixed wage floor. We have the following result.
Theorem 2. Assume that (14) has a unique solution. For any model parameters λ0, N0, and α, any strictly
decreasing function Fp(c), any strictly increasing function Fd(w), any pickup time function tp that satisfies
Assumption 1, and any speed-density relation v(N) that satisfies Assumption 2, there exists w2 > w˜, such
that for any w˜ < w0 < w2, there exists p¯h > 0, so that ∂N∗h/∂ph = 0 and ∂λ
∗
h/∂ph = 0 for ∀ph ∈ (0, p¯h).
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix C. Theorem 2 states that there exists a regime under
which both the number of TNC drivers and the passenger arrival rates are unaffected by the congestion
charge. This indicates that the ride fare, driver wage and passenger cost remain constant in this regime
and the congestion charge is entirely imposed on the platform through a direct money transfer from the
platform to the city. In this scheme, congestion charge will not directly curb the congestion by reducing
traffic in the city. Instead, it can only indirectly mitigate traffic congestion by collecting taxes to subsidize
public transit.
6. Comparison between time-based and trip-based charges
This section provides a comparison of the trip-based and time-based congestion charges. To ensure a
meaningful comparison, we first set a target for the city’s tax revenue. This target can be achieved by
setting the appropriate charges. For each scheme, we find the charge that exactly attains the targeted tax
revenue and we compare the two schemes for the same target. The model parameters are consistent with
previous case studies in Section 4.1 and Section 5.
Figures 20-22 compare the number of drivers, passenger arrival rate and the vehicle occupancy of the two
schemes for different targets for the city’s tax revenue. Figure 23 and Figure 24 compare the ride fare and
the pickup time for the two schemes. Figure 25 compares the platform profit under the trip-based and
time-based charges. These results reveal that for the same realized tax revenue, the time-based charge is
Pareto superior to the trip-based charge (as currently implemented in NYC). Under the time-based charge,
the TNC platform earns a higher profit. For drivers, the time-based congestion charge does not affect their
surplus in the first regime as the same number of drivers are hired at the same wage. For passengers, the
time-based charge leads to a lower ride fare but a longer waiting time. However, the time-based congestion
charge also has higher passenger arrival rate (Figure 21). Since the demand function Fp(c) is monotonic,
this implies that the total travel cost c is lower and the passenger surplus is higher under the time-based
congestion charge.
In summary, the time-based congestion charge leads to higher passenger surplus and higher platform profit
(Figure 25), which benefits all participants of the transportation system. This is because the time-based
congestion surcharge penalizes idle vehicle hours and motivates the TNC to increase the occupancy rate of
the vehicles (see Figure 22). Based on the data for San Francisco, the surplus resulting from increased vehicle
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occupancy will be distributed to all market participants, including the passengers, the TNC platform, and
the city.
While the aforementioned results do not necessarily hold for all levels of targeted tax revenues, the con-
clusion is indeed applicable for a large range of model parameters in the regime of practical interest.
To formally present this claim, we define N∗t , w∗t , λ∗t , c∗t , P ∗t , T r∗t as the optimal solution to (10) and denote
N∗h , w
∗
h, λ
∗
h, c
∗
h, P
∗
h , T r
∗
h as the optimal solution to (14). They are respectively the optimal number of drivers,
driver wage, passenger arrival rate, total travel cost, platform profit, and city tax revenue. Note that all
variables with subscript t depend on pt and w0, and all variables with subscript h depend on ph and w0.
We suppress this dependence to simplify the notation whenever it is clear from the context.
Theorem 3. Assume that the profit optimization problems (10) and (14) both have unique solutions. As-
sume that Fp(c) and Fd(w) satisfy the logit model as specified in (18) and (19), respectively. For any pickup
time function tp that satisfies Assumption 1, any speed-density relation v(N) that satisfies Assumption 2,
and any model parameters Θ = {λ0, N0,M,L, vf , κ, α, , c0, σ, w0}, there exists w3 > w˜, such that for any
w˜ ≤ w0 ≤ w3, there exists p¯t so that for any trip-based congestion surcharge pt ∈ [0, p¯t], there exists a
time-based congestion surcharge ph that offers a Pareto improvement, i.e.
N∗h = N
∗
t , w
∗
h = w
∗
t = w0, λ
∗
h > λ
∗
t , c
∗
h < c
∗
t , P
∗
h > P
∗
t , T r
∗
h > Tr
∗
t
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix D. It shows that there exists a regime where a time-based
charge offers a Pareto improvement over a trip-based one. In this regime, for any trip-based charge, one
can find an appropriate time-based charge for which the same number of drivers is hired, more passengers
take TNC rides at a lower cost, the platform earns more profit, and the city collects more tax revenues to
subsidize public transit. For the case of San Francisco, we calculate w3 = $29.20/hour, and p¯t = $2.1/trip
when w0 = $26.35/hour.
Remark 2. Theorem 3 identified a regime under which a time-based congestion charge offers a Pareto
improvement. The caveat is that this regime only applies to the wage floor and congestion charge levels
within a certain range, i.e., w0 ∈ [w˜, w3], pt ∈ [0, p¯t]. Outside of this range, the comparison between the two
congestion charge schemes may depend on the model parameters. However, we emphasize that it is unlikely
for cities to impose very stringent policies that substantially raise the driver payment level (or surcharge
level), since this may drive the TNCs out of business. In practice, regulatory policies are likely to reside in
or stay close to the regime identified by this paper.
7. Sensitivity Analysis
This section reports a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of our results with respect to the model
parameters. We vary the model parameters of (14) and evaluate the impact of the time-based congestion
charge under distinct parameter values. The nominal values of the parameters are set to be the same as
in Section 4.1. We perturb λ0, N0 and α by 5% and investigate how these perturbations affect passengers,
drivers, and the TNC platform under the time-based charge.
Figure 26-28 show the number of drivers, passenger arrival rate, and the platform profit as functions of the
time-based congestion charge under different λ0 (the nominal value is 1049). Clearly, there are two regimes.
When λ0 increases, the TNC platform has more passengers, and therefore enjoys a higher profit. However,
we note that in the first regime, the number of drivers is not affected by λ0. This is because in the first
regime, both (15b) and (15c) are active, which determines N as N = N0Fd(w0).
Figure 29-31 show the number of drivers, passenger arrival rate, and the platform profit as functions of the
time-based charge for different N0 (the nominal value is 10K). There are clearly two regimes for the three
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Figure 26: Number of drivers as a func-
tion of ph under distinct λ0.
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Figure 27: Passenger arrival rate (/min)
as a function of ph under distinct λ0.
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Figure 28: Platform profit (per hour) as
a function of ph under distinct λ0.
0 2 4 6 8 10
3.2K
3.6K
4K
time-based tax
nu
m
be
r
of
dr
iv
er
N0 = 9.5K
N0 = 10K
N0 = 10.5K
Figure 29: Number of drivers as a func-
tion of ph under distinct N0.
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Figure 30: Passenger arrival rate (/min)
as a function of ph under distinct N0.
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Figure 31: Platform profit (per hour) as
a function of ph under distinct N0.
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Figure 32: Number of drivers as a func-
tion of ph under distinct α.
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Figure 33: Passenger arrival rate (/min)
as a function of ph under distinct α.
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Figure 34: Platform profit (per hour) as
a function of ph under distinct α.
values of N0. When N0 increases, the platform hires more drivers, attracts more passengers and collects a
higher profit. Platform profit is insensitive to the number of potential drivers.
Figure 32-34 show the number of drivers, passenger arrival rate, and the platform profit as functions of the
time-based charge for different α (the nominal value is 2.33). When α increases, both passenger arrival rate
and platform profit drop. We note that the platform profit is much more sensitive to α than it is to λ0 and
N0.
8. Conclusion
This paper describes the impact of two proposed congestion charges on TNC: (a) a charge based on vehicle
trips, and (b) a charge based on vehicle hours. We used a market equilibrium model to assess the joint
effect of minimum wage with either of these two charges. Surprisingly, we find that neither charging scheme
significantly affects the number of TNC vehicles since their effect is mitigated by the wage floor on TNC
drivers. Furthermore, we find that the time-based charge is Pareto superior compared with the trip-based
charge that is currently imposed in New York City. Under the time-based charge, more passengers take
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TNC rides at a cheaper overall travel cost, drivers remain unaffected, the platform earns a higher profit,
and the city collects more tax revenue from the TNC system to subsidize public transit.
The policy implication of these results are profound. First of all, our results imply that the TNC driver
minimum wage mitigates the effectiveness of the congestion charge (either time-based or trip-based) in
reducing the TNC traffic. Therefore, when a driver minimum wage is imposed, the cities can not merely
count on the congestion charge to reduce the number of TNC vehicles on the city’s street, unless the charge
is significant and exceeds certain threshold. Second, city planners should efficiently use the taxes collected
from TNCs to subsidize public transit. This enables the cities to improve its service quality and reduce the
service price of its buses and subways, which attracts more passengers to take public transit and reduce
traffic congestion. The efficient use of the tax revenue from TNC is crucial in achieving the congestion
mitigating goal, and this question certainly deserves further study. Third, our result suggests that the
time-based congestion charge is superior to the trip-based congestion charge. While most city selects the
trip-based congestion charge as a natural candidate of its charge scheme (e.g., NYC, Chicago, Seattle), a
shift to the time-based congestion charge is not difficult to implement: the city only needs to periodically
audit the operations data of the TNC and collect the charge based on the accumulated vehicle hours on
the platform.
Future research direction includes determining the optimal level of congestion charge that maximizes the
social welfare, extending the model to capture temporal and spatial aspect of the TNC market, and char-
acterizing the impact of regulatory policies on TNC competition.
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Appendix
A: Calibration of Model Parameters
We describe how the model parameters for San Francisco are obtained. Eleven parameters are to be esti-
mated, Θ = {λ0, N0,M,L, vf , κ, α, , c0, σ, w0}. Some of these parameters are taken directly from published
sources, the remaining parameters are based on ‘reverse engineering’: values are selected so that the results
of the optimization match source data.
The number of TNC rides and TNC drivers are from the SFCTA report [2]. It gives hourly passenger arrival
rates and the number of TNC vehicles over an entire day. We take the rates for an‘average’ Wednesday and
calculate the average passenger arrival rate6 is λ∗ = 157.4/min and the average number of TNC vehicles7 is
N∗ = 3000 (Figure 1 of [2]). According to [2], TNC vehicles provide approximately 15% intra-SF vehicles
trips. This implies that the arrival rate of potential passengers is λ0 = λ∗/0.15 = 1049/min. Assuming
that 30% of the for-hire vehicle drivers work for TNC (the rest work for food delivery, package delivery,
etc), the total number of potential drivers is N0 = N∗/0.3 = 10, 000.
The average TNC trip distance in San Francisco is 2.6 miles (Table 4 of [2]), and the average arterial traffic
speed of San Francisco is about 14 mph [3]. This gives the average trip time t0 = 11.14 min. From Lyft’s
pricing formula for San Francisco [49], a 2.6 mile, 11.14 min Lyft ride costs $11.8, i.e., p∗f = 11.8. This total
price is comprised of a service fee of $2.70, a base fare of $2.24, a per-mile fare of $0.93 and a per-minute
6The total number of TNC trip is 170000/day (Table 2 of [2]). Since there are virtually no rides between 12AM-6AM, we
divide 170,000/day by 18 hours to derive 157.4 trips/min.
7To be consistent with passenger arrival rate, we also take the average number of vehicle hours between 6AM to 12AM as
the market volume between 12AM-6AM is trivial.
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fare of $0.40 [49]. The TNC platform keeps 100% of the service fee and 25% of the rest, leading to an
average of 42% commission rate. This implies that the driver wage is w∗ = λ∗p∗f × 0.58/N∗ = $21.55/hour,
since 58% of the total passenger fare is shared by all N∗ drivers.
Taking the average pickup time as 5 minutes (page 2 of [50]), we obtain M based on (20),
M = vtp
√
(N − λ/µ) = 41.18.
where µ = 1/t0 is the service rate. To estimate vf and κ in Greenshield’s model, we need two data points
to fix the linear relationship (22). One data point is already available: we know that on average there are
3000 TNC vehicles and the traffic speed is v∗ = 14 mph. Another data point can be obtained from the fact
that arterial traffic speed declined from 18 mph to 14 mph between 2010 and 2016. Since TNC vehicles
only contributed to part of the decrease of traffic speed. Without TNC vehicles, the traffic speed in 2016
would range between 14 and 18 mph. We take vf = 15 mph, indicating that TNCs contribute to 25% of the
traffic speed reduction between 2010-2016 (TNCs may contribute more in the increase of VMT as there is
a nonlinear relationship between VMT and traffic speed), which provides another data point (when N = 0,
traffic speed is v = 15). We plug in these two points in (22) and obtain vf = 15 mph and κ = 0.0003.
Empirical study suggests that the value of travel time (VOT) for TNC customers ranges between $40 and
$100 per hour [51], and the the value of time while waiting for vehicle pickup is about 1.5 to 2.5 times VOT
[52, 53]. If we take VOT to be $70/hour and assume that the value of time while waiting is 2 times the
value of travel time, then we obtain α = 2.33.
The parameters of the logit model (, c0, σ and w0) can be uniquely determined by the aforementioned
parameter values based on reverse engineering. We select , c0, σ and w0 so that the optimal solution to
the following unregulated profit maximization problem is consistent with the values of λ0, N0,M,L, vf , κ, α
which we have just determined:
max
pf ,pd
λ(pf − pd) (23)
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf ) (24a)
N = N0Fd
(
λpd
N
)
(24b)
Reverse engineering yields  = 0.33, c0 = 31.18, σ = 0.089, and w0 = $31.04/hour.
B: Proof of Theorem 1
First, we note that the unregulated problem (23) is equivalent to the following:
max
pf ,N
λpf −Nw (25)
{
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf ) (26a)
N = N0Fd (w) (26b)
where we used the definition of driver wage (4) to obtain an optimization problem over ride fare pf and
driver wage w. Let p˜f and N˜ be the optimal solution to this unregulated problem (23), and let λ˜ and w˜
be the corresponding passenger arrival rate and driver wage.
When the minimum wage is greater than the optimal wage w˜, i.e., w0 > w˜, the minimum wage constraint
(11c) is active. In this case, the regulated profit maximization problem (10) can be reformulated as:
max
pf ,N
λpf −Nw0 (27)
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{
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf + pt) (28a)
N ≤ N0Fd (w0) , (28b)
where w0 is given exogenously8. Note that (27) can be be equivalently viewed as nested maximization,
where in the outer loop the platform chooses the number of drivers N and in the inner loop the platform
chooses the ride fare pf to maximize the profit. To prove Theorem 1, we first consider the inner problem
where N and w0 are given and the platform solves
max
pf
λpf (29)
s.t. λ = λ0Fp
(
αtp + βp0 + pf + pt
)
. (30)
Denote the optimal value of (29) by Γ(N, pt), which depends on N and pt. Since (10) has a unique solution
and Fd and Fp are continuously differentiable, Γ(N, pt) is a continuous function with respect to both N
and pt. The regulated profit maximization problem (27) can be written as
max
N
Γ(N, pt)−Nw0 (31)
s.t.N ≤ N0Fd (w0) . (32)
Similarly, the unregulated problem (25) can be written as
max
N
Γ(N, 0)−Nw (33)
s.t.N = N0Fd (w) . (34)
Since the solution to (33) is w˜, when the minimum wage w0 = w˜, the optimal number of drivers for (31) and
(33) are the same. Furthermore, based on (34), we have w = F−1d
(
N
N0
)
. Therefore (33) can be written as
max
N
Γ(N, 0)−NF−1d
(
N
N0
)
. (35)
The first order optimality condition for (35) indicates that
∂+Γ(N˜ , 0)
∂N
− w˜ − N˜
fd(w˜)
= 0, (36)
where fd(w) =
∂Fd(w)
∂w
. Since Fd(w) is strictly increasing, we have fd(w) > 0, and so
∂+Γ(N˜ , 0)
∂N
− w˜ = N˜
fd(w˜)
> 0. (37)
We apply (37) to the regulated case (31) and conclude that when the minimum wage satisfies w0 = w˜
and the charge is zero, i.e., pf = 0, the right derivative of the objective function (31) with respect to N
is strictly positive (see equation (37)). Since the first order conditions are continuous with respect to w0,
there exists w1 > w˜ such that for all w0 ∈ [w˜, w1) we have
∂+Γ(N∗t , 0)
∂N
− w0 > 0, (38)
8Compared with (26b), the supply function (28b) is an inequality since w is endogenous in (25) while w0 is exogenous in
(27).
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where N∗ is the corresponding optimal solution for the regulated problem. Furthermore, due to continuity,
for each w0 ∈ [w˜, w1), there exists p¯t > 0 so that for all pt ∈ [0, p¯t > 0)
∂+Γ(N∗t , pt)
∂N
− w0 > 0. (39)
This indicates that there exists w1 > w˜ such that for w0 ∈ [w˜, w1), the derivative of the profit with respect
to the number of drivers is strictly positive. This indicates that the platform will earn extra profit if it hires
more drivers. Therefore, it is optimal for the platform to hire all drivers available in the market, which
gives N∗t = N0Fd(w0). Clearly, the optimal number of drivers does not depend on pt when w0 is fixed. This
completes the proof.
C: Proof of Theorem 2
We can first show that there exists w2 > w˜, such that for any w˜ < w0 < w2, there exists p¯h > 0, so that
∂N∗h/∂ph = 0 for ph ∈ (0, p¯h).9 Therefore, we have N∗h(ph) = N0Fd(w0) for ∀ph ∈ (0, p¯h). Hence the
optimal number of passengers will not be affected by ph when ph ∈ (0, p¯h). This is because when we know
that the optimal number of drivers satisfies N∗ = N0Fd(w0), the profit maximization problem (14) can be
written as
max
pf
λpf (40)
s.t. λ = λ0Fp
(
αtp + βp0 + pf
)
. (41)
It is clear that ph does not affect the optimal solution to (40). This completes the proof.
D: Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, we first show that there exists w3 > w˜, such that for any w˜ ≤ w0 ≤ w3, there is p¯t
so that for any trip-based charge pt ∈ [0, p¯t], there exists a time-based charge ph that yields the same tax
revenue, but leads to higher passenger surplus and higher platform profit, i.e.,
N∗h = N
∗
t , w
∗
h = w
∗
t = w0, λ
∗
h > λ
∗
t , c
∗
h < c
∗
t , P
∗
h > P
∗
t , T r
∗
h = Tr
∗
t .
The result of Theorem 3 then follows by slightly increasing ph to make sure Tr∗h > Tr
∗
t without changing
the sign of other inequalities. Such ph exists due to continuity.
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, there exists w3 > w˜ such that for all w ∈ [w˜, w3), there is p¯t >
0 and p¯h > 0 so that for pt ∈ [0, p¯t) and ph ∈ [0, p¯h) we have N∗h(pt) = N∗h(ph) = N0Fd(w0). For
notational convenience, define Nˆ(w0) = N0Fd(w0) and suppress the dependence on w0 to simplify the
notation whenever the context is clear. Since w0 ≥ w˜, the minimum wage constraint is active in both (10)
and (14), thus w∗t = w∗h = w0.
To show that λ∗h > λ
∗
t , we first note that since N∗t = Nˆ , it is clear that λ∗t is the optimal solution to:
max
pf
λpf (42)
s.t. λ = λ0Fp
(
αtp + βp0 + pf + pt
)
. (43)
9The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is therefore omitted.
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We can regard this as an optimization problem over λ. After writing the objective function as solely a
function of λ, the first order optimality condition indicates that:
F−1p
(
λ∗t
λ0
)
− αtp
(
Nˆ − λ∗t /µ, v
)
− βp0 + λ
∗
t
λ0fp
(
F−1p
(
λ∗t
λ0
)) + λ∗tα
µ
∂tp(Nˆ − λ∗t /µ, v)
∂NI
− pt = 0. (44)
Similarly, since N∗h = Nˆ , we know that λ
∗
h is the optimal solution to
max
pf
λpf (45)
s.t. λ = λ0Fp
(
αtp + βp0 + pf
)
(46)
The first order condition with respect to λ gives
F−1p
(
λ∗h
λ0
)
− αtp
(
Nˆ − λ∗h/µ, v
)
− βp0 + λ
∗
h
λ0fp
(
F−1p
(
λ∗h
λ0
)) + λ∗hα
µ
∂tp(Nˆ − λ∗h/µ, v)
∂NI
= 0. (47)
It can be verified that when Fp(c) and Fd(w) satisfy the logit model as specified in (18) and (19) and
when Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, every term of (44) and (47) is an increasing function of λ. By
comparing (44) and (47) 10, we have λ∗t < λ∗h. By stricta monotonicity, this indicates that c
∗
t > c
∗
h.
Last, we show that there exists w3 > w˜, such that for any w˜ ≤ w0 ≤ w3, there is p¯t so that for any
trip-based charge pt ∈ [0, p¯t], there exists a time-based charge ph which ensures Tr∗h = Tr∗t and P ∗h > P ∗t .
Note that Tr∗t = λ∗t p∗t and Tr∗h = N
∗
hp
∗
h, and that there exists p¯t > 0 so that for any p
∗
t ∈ [0, p¯t], we can
find p∗h such that λ
∗
t p
∗
t = N
∗
hp
∗
h. After setting p
∗
h and p
∗
t so that Tr∗t = Tr∗h, we apply a change of variable
(i.e., pf = pf + pt) to transform (10) into:
max
pf ,pd,N
λ(pf − pd)− λpt (48)

λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf ) (49a)
N ≤ N0Fd
(
λpd
N
)
(49b)
λpd
N
≥ w0, (49c)
Then the two charging schemes (48) and (14) have the same constraints, and the optimal value to (48)
satisfies:
P ∗t = λ
∗
t p
∗
f,t − w0N∗t − λ∗t pt (50)
= λ∗t p
∗
f,t − w0N∗t − Tr∗t , (51)
where p∗f,t is the corresponding optimal ride fare for the trip-based congestion charge. The optimal value
to (14) satisfies
P ∗h = λ
∗
hp
∗
f,h − w0N∗h −N∗hph (52)
= λ∗hp
∗
f,h − w0N∗h − Tr∗h, (53)
10µ and v depend on the number of TNC vehicles N . Since N∗h and N
∗
t are the same, we do not need to distinguish µ and
v for these two cases.
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where p∗f,h is the corresponding optimal ride fare for the time-based charge.
Based on Theorem 2, we have λ∗h(ph) = λ
∗
h(0) and N
∗
h(ph) = N
∗
h(0) = for ph ∈ [0, p¯h). Therefore,
λ∗h(ph), N
∗
h(ph) and p
∗
f,h(ph) are the optimal solutions to the profit maximization problem with minimum
wage only (i.e., w0 > w˜ and ph = 0):
max
pf ,N
λpf −Nw0 (54){
λ = λ0Fp (αtp + βp0 + pf + pt) (55a)
N ≤ N0Fd (w0) . (55b)
This implies that λ∗hp
∗
f,h − w0N∗h > λ∗t p∗f,t − w0N∗t 11. This indicates that P ∗h > P ∗t , which completes the
proof.
11Otherwise, this contradicts with the fact that λ∗h, N
∗
h , p
∗
fh
is the optimal solution to (54).
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